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HomeEnvironmentIncentives for Forest Landowners to Tackle Invasive Species Linked to Land Management...

Incentives for Forest Landowners to Tackle Invasive Species Linked to Land Management Practices, Research Reveals

Many forests in the United States are under private ownership, especially in the Eastern and North Central regions. This situation complicates efforts to manage invasive plants and pests, as cooperation among various landowners is essential. A recent study conducted by the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign investigates how varying motivations for land ownership influence the willingness to take action, along with the most effective ways to introduce economic incentives.

In the United States, a significant number of forests are privately owned, particularly in the Eastern and North Central regions. This ownership structure presents challenges for controlling invasive plants and pests, as coordinated efforts among landowners are necessary. A new study from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign examines how differing motivations for land ownership affect the readiness to manage these issues and how to optimize economic incentives for efficient implementation.

Shadi Atallah, an associate professor in the Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics at Illinois, explains, “Some landowners are motivated by recreational activities, others focus on timber production, and some have mixed motivations. If one neighbor effectively controls invasive species while another does not, it could lead to problems as the species can expand over time and space.”

Currently, programs that share conservation costs can reimburse forest landowners for up to 75% of the expenses incurred in managing invasive species. However, Atallah points out that this may not be the most effective allocation of resources.

“When providing an incentive, it’s important to ensure that the recipient would not have acted without it; otherwise, funds may be wasted. Should we adjust the criteria for these payments to enhance their effectiveness?”

Using game theory, Atallah analyzed these questions, particularly looking at the glossy buckthorn, an invasive and rapidly propagating shrub affecting Eastern white pine forests in the U.S. This invader can create dense thickets in the forest understory, hindering the growth of young pine trees and disrupting wildlife habitats.

In an earlier study, Atallah surveyed family forest owners in Maine and New Hampshire to gauge how their willingness to manage glossy buckthorn was influenced by its impact on timber production, recreational trails, and wildlife observation. For this study, he created a theoretical model to estimate how different types of landowners would behave and how their neighbors might react over time under various scenarios.

Atallah’s model examined two types of landowners: one who enjoys recreational activities like hiking but is deterred by the invasive shrub, and another focused on timber production who faces diminished yield due to the shrub’s interference with the growth of white pine.

He also assessed how connected forests influence the spread of invasive species.

“Some invasive plants are primarily dispersed over short distances by animals, whereas others spread over long distances through birds or waterfowl, with varying rates of spread depending on the species. It’s also crucial to determine the initial site of the bioinvasion and whether controlling it early on is beneficial,” he added.

The findings indicate that in most scenarios, recreational landowners would not manage the invasive shrub without financial support, whereas timber producers would opt to control it independently of subsidies.

“Only in cases of rapid long-distance dispersal does the cost of control become prohibitively high, necessitating support. This aligns with current practices, where all landowners are eligible for assistance. However, in other scenarios—whether long-distance or varying rates of short-distance dispersal—it would be more strategic to provide funding specifically to recreationists, as they can contribute to the spread if they choose not to control the invasive species.”

Atallah acknowledged that this approach may seem unfair; however, timber producers would still gain advantages even if only the recreationists received assistance because an earlier response limits the spread of invasives.

“When neighboring forests are managed effectively, the cost burden for timber producers decreases. Instead of spreading funds thinly among both types of landowners, we could allocate 75% of control costs to recreationists. This would reduce the invasive threats for timber owners, making control more affordable.”

This study illustrates one aspect of landowner motivations, but Atallah emphasizes that the dynamics could differ in other scenarios.

“My recommendation is to target subsidies towards the weakest link—those who would remain inactive without incentives and contribute to the problem. In this context, that would be the recreationists, but similar principles could apply in reverse situations. The model is flexible enough to apply to various circumstances,” he remarked.

The goal is to examine how differing motivations behind land ownership can lead to distinct decisions in managing invasive species and to prioritize assistance for those unlikely to act without support.